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Are there lessons we could all learn from how the modern military copes with unexpected situations?

Andy Millar
Hi,


A couple of serious issues I was involved with this weekend made me think of this. One was in the engineering world to do with the day job, I was reviewing a very serious incident report (fortunately no fatalities but very close) involving a mixture of everyone trying to do the best they could, but perhaps over reliant on structured checklists which had completely missed an entire piece of equipment in a fairly unique situation. The other was a medical issue in the family, once again all the individual hospital staff were doing their best, but there was a bit of the process that just didn't cope with a particular situation.


Which made me think of something that's long been at the back of my mind: I've never worked in a military environment, but my impression of the modern military from the contacts I have had is that there is still a very structured hierarchy, chain of command, and focus on process, but equally it appears that somehow there is also the ability for small units to have the skills and freedom to evaluate and make their own decisions when challenging circumstances arise - exactly the key skills that were missing in the two examples above. 


So really two questions I'd really like to know other people's views on (particularly those who have worked across both the military and civilian worlds): firstly are my impressions above correct? And if so (or even if a bit wrong but on the right lines) are there lessons we can learn from how this works that we can apply to the management of engineering activities in the wider world - particularly in safety critical issues where we need structure but also need the ability to rapidly and effectively cope with new problems when they come up?   


Thanks,


Andy
  • 0

    Mission Command.  Letting the subordinate commander make decisions.  Delegating responsibility; however, not abdicating.  But some may not think this is the case!



    Comander’s Intent.  A subordinate commander would have the same broad concept and understanding of where their left and right arcs are and what decisions they can make that they believe will lead to the end-state: the commander's desires.



    After 37 years in the military I do not believe the military are excessively hierarchical it just appears that way, especially if you are dealing with those working for the DLO or Command.  Everybody is answerable to a boss!



    Whatever group (Administration, Logistics, Engineering or Support), in the military we train, train, train.  However, accidents still happen, pieces of equipment gets lost.  Exactly the same everywhere else.  Yes we learn to adapt and or improvise, we communicate and listen, but sometimes we get it wrong.  There are also those who infer they did not get the message or do not speak up when they know something will not is wrong.  But it is very rare that someone goes to work to have a bad day, nevertheless sometimes it does happen and we learn by these mistakes.



    Usually commanders rely on their NCOs to get the job done.  They are the ones with all the experience.  A good leader will listen to his NCO and then provide the direction, but it is still his team that gets the task completed.  There maybe occasions, out in the field, when a team is led by an NCO, they are perfectly capable of making the correct decision and looking after their troops, as long as he knows his commanders intent.



    I have investigated a many incidents, one such incident was a bunch of NCO were asked to complete a task.  With the best endeavours they attempted the job in hand until an incident occurred. Luckily no-one was injured.  This was a simple everyday task and procedures were well documented.  What I took away from this incident was that even though they were all NCOs, no one took the lead.  Additionally, the individual who gave out the task, did not delegate a lead.  They all wanted to get the job completed.  If someone had stepped back to see what was happening, it could have reduced the potential for the incident occurring.  The root cause of the incident was a maintenance failure, unbeknown to the team.  Not having a leader was a contributory factor.



    In the two case you describe, the incidents appear to be due to human error.



    How many times had it happened before?  We should not be looking to blame, we should be looking for the root cause and how to prevent the incident from happening again: just culture and psychological safety.


  • Former Community Member
    0 Former Community Member
    John, I agree, a trained and innovative human leader in the loop is a great asset, but can also be a weakness when there are no chiefs, or there is no-one willing to step back, look at the bigger picture and stand up say - 'something isn't right here' and lead a way through the problem. Hierachy has strengths, but a also a weakness in suppressing leadership from below. Some of the best solutions and options to problems I had as an officer came from the JNCOs if they were given the space to overcome the natural military hierarchy and strictures, which are essential, but need to be released by the intelligent commander.
  • 0
    I don't know about unexpected situations, but it took the military long enough to figure out that marching a line of men towards enemy machine guns was not a great idea.
  • Former Community Member
    0 Former Community Member
    Although, Alex, the objectives were largely met. It's an inescapable fact that if you want to take and hold ground, you need men on the ground - you can't do if from the air, or with artillery - unless you resort to NBC weapons. Air and artillery simply support those ground fuctions


    Even during the Falklands unpleasantness, it involved chaps running up hill in the face of enemy fire, hoping that the support is keeping their heads down and not shooting at you.


    Don't believe everything you may have read regarding "lions led by donkeys"


    Regards


    OMS
  • 0
    Alex,


    Your historical point is valid to some extent, in the same way that other historical “wrongs” have left a cultural legacy. My grandfather served on the Western Front and was embittered to return to a land, still run by and for the landed gentry. This was a common experience. The are many other examples of a legacy of bitterness, including slavery, racial, gender and class disadvantage, colonialism, imperialism etc.

    Andy,


    The question assumes that “The Modern Military” is a homogenous entity and perhaps it appears so, with uniforms, unit structure and rank hierarchy. I haven’t conducted a systematic study, although I wouldn’t be surprised if some others have, into cultural differences within the military.     Any UK analysis would realistically also need to consider, not just those in uniform, but the interrelated civilian elements of MOD and private sector R&D/suppliers.

    Arguably the primary skill of the military is operational, planning, logistics and clarity of communication being important.  MOD is an arm of the civil service. Technical innovation is carried out by the likes of QinetiQ, BAE systems, ETC.  The track record of defence procurement, isn’t particularly good. In the words of a former colleague “smart contractors run rings around MOD”. So, if there are any lessons to learn, they arguably don’t cast the military in a very favourable light.  

    An advantage that the military has, in peacetime at least, is extensive opportunities to plan and rehearse. Meticulous planning and constant practice should always hone performance. Another significant advantage is the quality of technical training, especially benefitting the NCOs.


    Until the early 1990s, similar establishments existed in many major industries (CEGB in my case), but these were mostly culled or greatly reduced, furthermore Technical Colleges lost out to Universities.

    Therefore, the lesson is quality of training. In the case of officers, planning organisation and communication (strategic at the higher level) and for those at the “sharp end “, such as NCOs real understanding of immediately relevant technology.

    PS I was of course bound to come to that conclusion as a former Company Training Manager and a CIPD Fellow! ? 

    PS (2) just saw OMS post, good points, my cousin was a Corporal in 2 Para during the Falklands War.      

  • 0
    OMS:

    Although, Alex, the objectives were largely met. 


    If the objective was losing a bucketload of soldiers. You can't eliminate risk from battle, but a line of soldiers walking towards a machine gun isn't even trying to reduce the risk. How men did it, god knows. My grandfather and three brothers returned from that madness, which in itself can't be too common.


  • Former Community Member
    0 Former Community Member
    Well, the mission statement wasn't to lose a bucketful of soldiers, it was to take ground, dominate that area, break the stalemate of attritional trench warfare (which was still killing a lot of men) and use that as the jumping off point for the next objective, until the enemy were subdued. It's why the army use the term "move through the position"


    Sure it was all a bit grim if you were in the first wave - no different to D-Day,  but it got easier with each and every successive wave of men and material you can move up, and keep deploying. (See, for example the efforts of the red ball express strategy to keep supporting the advancing front line troops until the port of Antwerp was opened up). It's also why the south coast ports weren't designated to receive casualties from D-Day - it was one way, with the injured being moved into places like the Bristol Channel where they could be landed on the Somerset and South Wales coasts on big open beaches where ships could be beached, and the casualties disembarked to clearing hospitals (Swansea as one example, where new roads were constructed to expanded hospital capability)


    Which probably brings us back on subject as to how the military devolve responsibility down to an almost individual level, but maintain control and oversight through the commanders intent 


    Regards


    OMS


  • 0
    This thread got promoted on LinkedIn so I thought I’d make my first contribution on here and spotted Roy’s comment about the quality and extent of training!


    There’s a lot of debate in certain circles about Safety-I (stopping things going wrong) and Safety-II (making sure things go right) which I think ties in with this.  Safety-II is promoted as being much better at dealing with uncertainty than Safety-I for the sorts of reasons I think have already been touched on, although it does depend on those doing the work having a much higher level of competence than just following a checklist or list of instructions so I wouldn’t like to say how much of it is down to the Safety-II approach in and of itself, and how much is down to the higher level of training required to implement a Safety-II approach within an organisation!


    While I was only ever in the TA Signals, the training I received - largely under the wing of my Det Commander as far as my specialist role went - is a bit like how apprentices used to be trained in industry.  While it meant that the two of us could be relied on to do a job on our Radio Relay wagon having been given only a grid reference and a bunch of bearings and frequencies, it probably involved a lot more time and effort in (and presumably therefore money) in getting to that position than I reckon a lot of businesses would be happy spending these days...
  • Former Community Member
    0 Former Community Member
    Radio relay wagon: Four Square Bruin; Ptarmigan; or Bowman?


    There is much to learn from the military, but also the military can learn from the commercial world on ensuring stuffs goes right, as well as minimising and having resilience plans and the training and eduction to adapt rapidly for the times when stuff goes wrong.
  • 0
    Ptarmigan for me, although being TA the vehicles were of course hand-me-downs!


    As regards the overall point about industry learning from the military, it’s definitely a case of “it depends” though.  Not so long ago I put someone’s nose seriously out of joint over on LinkedIn by posting a link to an article about all the negative things Deming reckoned industry had picked up from the military in response to them posting a link to an article from the Economist about all the good things industry could learn from the military!


    YMMV...

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